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Abstract. The critical nature of many complex software-intensive sys-
tems calls for formal, rigorous architecture descriptions as means of sup-
porting automated verification and enforcement of architectural prop-
erties and constraints. Model checking has been one of the most used
techniques to automatically analyze software architectures with respect
to the satisfaction of architectural properties. However, such a technique
leads to an exhaustive exploration of all possible states of the system
under verification, a problem that becomes more severe when verifying
dynamic software systems due to their typical non-deterministic runtime
behavior and unpredictable operation conditions. To tackle these issues,
we propose using statistical model checking (SMC) to support the anal-
ysis of dynamic software architectures while aiming at reducing effort,
computational resources, and time required for this task. In this paper,
we introduce a novel notation to formally express architectural proper-
ties as well as an SMC-based toolchain for verifying dynamic software
architectures described in pi-ADL, a formal architecture description lan-
guage. We use a flood monitoring system to show how to express relevant
properties to be verified, as well as we report the results of some compu-
tational experiments performed to assess the efficiency of our approach.
1 Introduction
One of the major challenges in software engineering is to ensure correctness of
software-intensive systems, especially as they have become increasingly complex
and used in many critical domains. Ensuring these concerns becomes more im-
portant mainly when evolving these systems since such a verification needs to be
performed before, during, and after evolution. In this context, software architec-
tures play an essential role since they represent an early blueprint for the system
construction, deployment, execution, and evolution, thereby fostering an early
analysis of a system and contributing to reduce the cost of software maintenance.
The critical nature of many complex software systems calls for rigorous archi-
tectural models (such as formal architecture descriptions) as means of supporting
the automated verification and enforcement of architectural properties. However,
architecture descriptions should not cover only structure and behavior of a soft-
ware architecture, but also the required and desired architectural properties, in
particular the ones related to consistency and correctness [16]. For instance, after
describing a software architecture, a software architect might want to verify if it
is complete, consistent, and correct with respect to architectural properties.
In order to foster the automated verification of architectural properties based
on architecture descriptions, they need to be formally specified. Despite the in-
herent difficulty of pursuing formal methods, the advantage of a formal verifica-
tion is to precisely determine if a software system can satisfy properties related
to user requirements. Additionally, automated verification provides an efficient
method to check the correctness of architectural design. As reported by Zhang
et al. [20], one of the most popular formal methods for analyzing software ar-
chitectures is model checking, an exhaustive, automatic verification technique
whose general goal is to verify if an architectural specification satisfies architec-
tural properties [8]. It takes as inputs a representation of the system (e.g., an
architecture description) and a set of property specifications expressed in some
notation. The model checker returns true, if the properties are satisfied, or false
with the case in which a given property is violated.
Despite its wide and successful use, model checking faces a critical challenge
with respect to scalability. Holzmann [10] remarks that no currently available
traditional model checking approach is exempted from the state space explosion
problem, that is, the exponential growth of the state space. This problem is ex-
acerbated in the contemporary dynamic software systems for two main reasons,
namely (i) the non-determinism of their behavior caused by concurrency and
(ii) the unpredictable environmental conditions in which they operate. In spite
of the existence of a number of techniques aimed at reducing the state space,
such a problem remains intractable for some software systems, thereby making
the use of traditional model checking techniques a prohibitive choice in terms of
execution time and computational resources. As a consequence, software archi-
tects have to trade-off the risks of possibly undiscovered problems related to the
violation of architectural properties against the practical limitations of applying
a model checking technique on a very large architectural model.
Verification techniques such as model checking require not only significant
execution time and computational resources, but also an unneglectable effort
from architects. This is one of the major reasons that often hinders the adoption
of formal-based techniques in software industry, as revealed in a recent survey in
this context [15]. Therefore, providing affordable, efficient approaches for rigor-
ously verifying properties in dynamic software architectures is a major challenge.
In order to tackle the aforementioned issues, this paper proposes the use of
statistical model checking (SMC) for supporting the formal analysis of dynamic
software architectures while striving to reduce effort, computational resources,
and time for performing this task. SMC is a probabilistic, simulation-based tech-
nique intended to verify, at a given confidence level, if a certain property is satis-
fied during the execution of a system [13]. Unlike conventional formal verification
techniques such as model checking, SMC does not analyze the internal logic of
the target system, thereby not suffering from the state space explosion problem
[12]. Therefore, an architect wishing to assess the correctness of an architecture
has to build an executable model of the system. In our opinion, this is much
easier than building a model of the system that is abstract enough to be used
in a model checker, yet detailed enough to detect meaningful errors. Further-
more, an SMC-based approach promotes better scalability and less consumption
of computational resources, important factors to be considered when analyzing
software architectures for complex critical systems. SMC requires (i) a model
whose execution is probabilistic and (ii) a language for expressing properties to
be verified and a monitor for deciding them on finite traces.
Our main contribution is a toolchain for verifying dynamic software archi-
tectures described in pi-ADL, a formal architecture description language [5, 17].
The pi-ADL language does not natively allow a probabilistic execution, but rather
provides a non-deterministic specification of a dynamic architecture. Therefore,
we obtain a probabilistic model by resolving non-determinism by probabilities,
which is enforced by a stochastic scheduler. We used DynBLTL [19], a new logic
to express properties about dynamic systems. Furthermore, we use a real-world
flood monitoring system to show how to express relevant properties to be verified,
as well as we report the results of some computational experiments performed
to assess the efficiency of our approach.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 briefly presents
the SMC technique. Section 3 details how to stochastically execute pi-ADL ar-
chitecture descriptions. Section 4 introduces our notation to formally express
properties of dynamic software architectures. Section 5 presents the developed
SMC-based toolchain to verify dynamic software architectures. In Section 6, a
flood monitoring system is used as case study to show how to express properties
with DynBLTL and the results of experiments on the computational effort to
verify these properties. Finally, Section 7 contains some concluding remarks.
2 Statistical Model Checking
SMC is a probabilistic, simulation-based approach that consists of building a
statistical model of finite executions of the system under verification and deduc-
ing the probability of satisfying a given property within confidence bounds. This
technique provides a number of advantages in comparison to traditional model
checking techniques. First (and perhaps the most important one), this technique
does not suffer from the state space explosion problem since it does not analyze
the internal logic of the system under verification, neither requires the entire rep-
resentation of the state space, thus making it a promising approach for verifying
complex large-scale and critical software systems [12]. Second, SMC requires only
the system be able to be simulated, so that it can be applied to larger classes of
systems, including black-box and infinite-state systems. Third, the proliferation
of parallel computer architectures makes the production of multiple independent
simulation runs relatively easier. Fourth, despite SMC can provide approximate
results (as opposed to exact results provided by traditional model checking), it
is compensated by a better scalability and less consumption of computational
resources. In some cases, knowing the result with less than 100% of confidence
is quite acceptable or even the unique available option. Therefore, SMC allows
trading-off between verification accuracy and computational time by selecting
appropriate precision parameter values. For example, if the project time is lim-
ited, it may be more valuable obtaining less precise verification in short time
than more precise verification results in much longer time.
Figure 1 illustrates a general schema on how the SMC technique works. A
statistical model checker basically consists of a simulator for running the system
under verification, a model checker for verifying properties, and a statistical an-
alyzer responsible for calculating probabilities and performing statistical tests.
It receives three inputs: (i) an executable stochastic model of the target system
M ; (ii) a formula ϕ expressing a bounded property to be verified, i.e., a property
that can be decided over a finite execution of M ; and (iii) user-defined preci-
sion parameters determining the accuracy of the probability estimation. The
model M is stochastic in the sense that the next state is probabilistically chosen
among the states that are reachable from the current one. As a consequence,
some executions of M satisfy ϕ and others do not satisfy it, depending on the
probabilistic choices made during these executions. The simulator executes M
and generates an execution trace σi, composed of a sequence of states. Next, the
model checker determines if σi satisfies ϕ and sends the result (either success
or failure) to the statistical analyzer, which in turn estimates the probability p
for M to satisfy ϕ. The simulator repeatedly generates other execution traces
σi+1 until the analyzer determines that enough traces have been analyzed to
produce an estimation of p satisfying the precision parameters. It is important
to highlight that a higher accuracy of the answer provided by the model checker
requires generating more execution traces through simulations.
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Fig. 1. Working schema of the SMC technique.
3 Stochastic Execution of pi-ADL models
In this section, we briefly recall how the pi-ADL language allows describing dy-
namic software architectures. As SMC is a stochastic technique, the executable
model representing the system needs to be stochastic, a feature that pi-ADL does
not possess. For this reason, we have provided a way of producing a stochastic
executable model from pi-ADL architecture descriptions, thus allowing for prop-
erty verification using SMC. Finally, we show how to extract execution traces
from a stochastic execution.
3.1 Modeling Dynamic Architectures in pi-ADL
pi-ADL [17] is a formal, well-founded theoretically language intended to describe
software architectures under both structural and behavioral viewpoints. In order
to cope with dynamicity concerns, pi-ADL is be endowed with architectural-level
primitives for specifying programmed reconfiguration operations, i.e., foreseen,
pre-planned changes described at design time and triggered at runtime by the
system itself under a given condition or event. Additionally, code source in the Go
programming language [1] is automatically generated from pi-ADL architecture
descriptions, thereby allowing for their execution [6].
From the structural viewpoint, a software architecture is described in pi-
ADL in terms of components, connectors, and their composition to form the
system, i.e., an architecture as a configuration of components and connectors.
From the behavioral viewpoint, both components and connectors comprise a
behavior, which expresses the interaction of an architectural element and its
internal computation and uses connections to send and receive values between
architectural elements. The attachment of a component to a connector (and vice-
versa) is made by unifying their connections. Therefore, the transmission of a
value from an architectural element to another is possible only if (i) the output
connection of the sender is unified to the input connection of the receiver, (ii)
the sender is ready to send a value through that output connection, and (iii) the
receiver is ready to receive a value on that input connection.
In pi-ADL, dynamic reconfiguration is obtained by decomposing architectures
[5]. The decomposition action removes all unifications defined in the original
architecture, but it does not terminate its elements. The decomposition of a given
architecture A is typically called from another coexisting architecture B, which
results from a reconfiguration applied over A. After calling the decomposition of
A, B can access and modify the elements originally instantiated in A.
3.2 Resolving Non-Determinism in pi-ADL
In pi-ADL, non-determinism occurs in two different ways. First, whenever several
actions are possible, any one of them can be executed as the next action, i.e., the
choice of the next action to execute is non-deterministic. Second, some functions
can declared as unobservable, thus meaning that its internal operations are con-
cealed at the architectural level. In this case, the value returned by the function
is also non-deterministic because it is not defined in the model. As a stochastic
process is required for performing SMC, we resolve the non-determinism of pi-
ADL models by using probabilities. In the following, we describe how to proceed
in the aforementioned cases.
Resolving non-determinism in the choice of the next action. The
Go code from a pi-ADL architecture description encodes architectural element
(component or connector) as a concurrent goroutine, a lightweight process similar
to a thread. The communication between architectural elements takes place via
a channel, another Go construct. If several communications are possible, the Go
runtime chooses one of them to execute according to a FIFO (first-in, first out)
policy. Such a policy is not suitable for SMC since it is necessary to specify how
the next action is chosen.
To support the stochastic scheduling of actions, we have implemented a sched-
uler as a goroutine that controls all non-local actions, i.e., composition, decompo-
sition or communication. Whenever an architectural element needs to perform a
non-local action, it informs the scheduler and blocks until the scheduler responds.
The scheduler responds with the action executed (if the component submitted a
choice between several actions) and a return value, corresponding either to the
reception side of a communication or a decomposed architecture.
Fig. 2 depicts the behavior of the scheduler. The scheduler waits until all
components and connectors have indicated their possible actions. At this step,
the scheduler builds a list of possible rendezvous by checking which declared uni-
fications have both sender and receiver ready to communicate. For this purpose,
the scheduler maintains a list of the active architectures and the corresponding
unifications. The possible communications are added to the list of possible ac-
tions and the scheduler chooses one of them according to a probabilistic choice
function. The scheduler then executes the action and outputs its effect to the
statistical model checker. Finally, the scheduler notifies the components and
connectors involved in the action.
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Fig. 2. Scheduler to support the stochastic simulation of a pi-ADL model
Resolving non-determinism in unobservable functions. The functions
declared unobservable require an implementation to allow simulating the model.
In practice, this implementation is provided in form of a Go function whose
return value can be determined by a probability distribution. Such an imple-
mentation relies on the Go libraries that implement usual probability distribu-
tions. In particular, such functions can model inputs of the systems that have a
known probabilistic value, i.e., input to a component, time to the next failure of
a component, etc.
3.3 Trace of a Stochastic Execution
In order to perform SMC for verifying dynamic software architectures, we ab-
stract away the inner structure of the components and represent a state of the
system as a directed graph g = (V,E) in which V is a finite set of nodes and
E is a finite set of edges. Each node v ∈ V represents an architectural element
(component or connector) whereas each direct edge e ∈ E represents a commu-
nication channel between two architectural elements.
The SMC technique relies on checking multiple execution traces resulted
from simulations of the system under verification against the specified properties.
Therefore, as a simulation ω results in a trace σ composed of a finite sequence
of states, σ can be defined as a sequence of state graphs gi (i ∈ N), i.e., σ =
{g0, g1, . . . , gn}. Aiming at obtaining an execution trace from an architecture
description in pi-ADL, the simulation emits explicit messages recording a set of
actions on the state graph.
4 A Novel Notation for Expressing Properties in
Dynamic Software Architectures
Most architectural properties to be verified by using model checking techniques
are temporal [20], i.e., they are qualified and can be reasoned upon a sequence of
system states along the time. In the literature, linear temporal logic (LTL) [18]
has been often used as underlying formalism for specifying temporal architectural
properties and verifying them through model checking. LTL extends classical
Boolean logic with temporal operators that allow reasoning on the temporal
dimension of the execution of the system. In this perspective, LTL can be used
to encode formulas about the future of execution paths (sequences of states),
e.g., a condition that will be eventually true, a condition that will be true until
another fact becomes true, etc.
Besides using standard propositional logic operators, LTL defines four tem-
poral operators, namely: (i) next, which means that a formula ϕ will be true in
the next step; (ii) finally or eventually, which indicates that a formula ϕ will be
true at least once in the time interval; (iii) globally or always, which means that
a formula ϕ will be true at all times in the time interval; and (iv) until, which
indicates that either a formula ϕ is initially true or another previous formula
ψ is true until ϕ become true at the current or a future time. SMC techniques
verify bounded properties, i.e., where temporal operators are parameterized by a
time bound. While LTL-based formulas aim at specifying the infinite behavior
of the system, a time-bounded form of LTL called BLTL considers properties
that can be decided on finite sequences of execution states.
Traditional versions of temporal logics such as LTL and BLTL are expressed
over atomic predicates that evaluate properties to a Boolean value at every point
of execution. However, a key characteristic of dynamic software systems is the
impossibility of foreseeing the exact set of architectural elements deployed at
a given point of execution. Such traditional formalisms do not allow reasoning
about elements that may appear, disappear, be connected or be disconnected
during the execution of the system for two main reasons. First, specifying a
predicate for each property of each element is not possible as the set of archi-
tectural elements may be unknown a priori. Second, there is no canonical way
of assigning a truth value to a property about an element that does not exist
at the considered point of execution. In addition, existing approaches to tackle
such issues typically focus on behavioral properties, but they do not address
architectural properties [7]. On the other hand, some approaches assume that
the architectures are static [3]. These limitations have led us to propose Dyn-
BLTL, an extension of BLTL aimed at formally expressing properties in dynamic
software architectures.
The novel notation was designed to handle the absence of an architectural
element in a given formula expressing a property (c.f. [19]). In practice, this
means that a Boolean expression can take three values, namely true, false or
undefined. The undefined value refers to the fact that an expression may not be
evaluated depending on the current runtime configuration of the system. This is
necessary for situations in which it is not possible to evaluate an expression in the
considered point of execution, e.g., a statement about an architectural element
that does not exist at that moment. Some operators interpret the undefined
value as true or false, depending on the context. Such operators have to be used
at the root of the formula to ensure that it returns a boolean.
DynBLTL allows expressing properties using (i) arithmetic, logical, and com-
parison operations on values, (ii) existential and universal quantifications, and
traditionally used in predicate logic, and (iii) some predefined functions that
can be used to explore the architectural configuration. Furthermore, there are
four temporal operators, namely in, eventually before, always during, and until,
which are similar to the ones defined in both LTL and BLTL. Some examples of
DynBLTL properties are presented in Section 6.2.
5 A Toolchain to Simulate and Verify Dynamic Software
Architectures
SMC techniques rely on the simulation of an executable model of the system
under verification against a set of formulas expressing bounded properties to be
verified (see Section 2). These elements are provided as inputs to a statistical
model checker, which basically consists of (i) a simulator for running the exe-
cutable model of the system under verification, (ii) a model checker for verifying
properties, and (iii) a statistical analyzer responsible for calculating probabilities
and performing statistical tests.
Among the SMC tools available in the literature, PLASMA [2] is a compact,
flexible platform that enables users to create custom SMC plug-ins atop it. For
instance, users who have developed their own model description language can
use it with PLASMA by providing a simulator plug-in. Similarly, users can add
custom languages for specifying properties and use the available SMC algorithms
through a checker plug-in. Besides its efficiency and good performance results
[4, 11, 14], such a flexibility was one of the main reasons motivating the choice of
PLASMA to serve as basis to develop the toolchain for specifying and verifying
properties of dynamic software architectures.
Fig. 3 provides an overview of our SMC-based toolchain for verifying prop-
erties of dynamic software architectures. The inputs for the process are (i) an
architecture description in pi-ADL and (ii) a set of properties specified in Dyn-
BLTL. By following the process proposed in our previous work [5, 6], the archi-
tecture description in pi-ADL is translated towards generating source code in
Go. As pi-ADL architectural models do not have a stochastic execution, they
are linked to a stochastic scheduler parameterized by a probability distribution
for drawing the next action, as described in Section 3. Furthermore, we use ex-
isting probability distribution Go libraries to model inputs of system models as
user functions. The program resulting from the compilation of the generated
Go source code emits messages referring to transitions from a given state to
another in case of addition, attachment, detachment, and value exchanges of
architectural elements.
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Fig. 3. Overview of the proposed SMC-based toolchain for verifying properties of dy-
namic software architectures.
We have developed two plug-ins1 atop the PLASMA platform, namely (i)
a simulator plug-in that interprets execution traces produced by the generated
Go program and (ii) a checker plug-in that implements DynBLTL. With this
toolchain, a software architect is able to evaluate the probability of a pi-ADL
architectural model to satisfy a given property specified in DynBLTL.
1 The developed tools are available at http://plasma4pi-adl.gforge.inria.fr.
6 Case Study
In this section, we apply our approach to a real-world flood monitoring system
used as a case study. Section 6.1 presents an overview of the system and Section
6.2 describes some relevant properties to be verified in the context of this system.
At last, Section 6.3 reports some computational experiments performed to assess
the efficiency of our approach with the developed toolchain.
6.1 Description
A flood monitoring system can support monitoring urban rivers and create alert
messages to notify authorities and citizens about the risks of an imminent flood,
thereby fostering effective predictions and improving warning times. This sys-
tem is typically based on a wireless sensor network composed of sensors that
measures the water level in flood-prone areas near the river. In addition, a gate-
way station analyzes data measured by motes, makes such data available, and
can trigger alerts when a flood condition is detected. The communication among
these elements takes place by using wireless network connections, such as WiFi,
ZigBee, GPRS, Bluetooth, etc.
Fig. 4 shows the main architecture of the system. Sensor components com-
municate with each other through ZigBee connectors and a gateway component
receives all measurements to evaluate the current risk. Each measure taken by
a sensor is propagated its neighbors via ZigBee connectors until reaching the
gateway.
newS valReady valSent Sfailed
SensorEnv
value
sense end
Sensorpass measure
killZb
input
die
output
ZigBee
tick
Budget
spendbalance
rcnfStart rcnfEnd
Reconf
removeS newS
sendCov
newS valReady valSent Sfailed tick rcnfStart rcnfEnd
Env flood
removeS newS
pass
balance
spent
alert
newCov
Gateway
alert
flood
Observer
Fig. 4. Overview of the main architecture of the flood monitoring system. Components
are yellow-colored whereas connectors are blue-colored.
Fig. 5 shows an excerpt of the pi-ADL description for the sensor component.
The behavior of this components comprises choosing between two alternatives,
either obtaining a new measure (i) from the environment via the sense input
connection or (ii) from a neighbor sensor via the pass input connection. After
receiving the gathered value, it is transmitted through the measure output con-
nection. Reading a negative value indicates a failure of the sensor, so that it
becomes a FailingSensor, which simply ignores all incoming messages.
component Sensor is abstraction() {
type CmH20 is tuple[Behavior,Real]
type MV is Real
connection sense is in(MV)
connection measure is out(CmH20)
connection pass is in(CmH20)
connection end is in(Integer)
connection killZb is out(Boolean)
behavior is {
choose {
via sense receive m : MV
via measure send CmH20(tuple[self, m])
if m < 0.0 then {
become(FailingSensor())
}
or
via pass receive other_measure : CmH20
via measure send other_measure
}
}
}
Fig. 5. Partial pi-ADL description of the sensor component
The environment is modeled through the Env component as well as the Sen-
sorEnv and Budget connectors. Env is responsible for synchronizing the model
by defining cycles corresponding to the frequency at which measures are taken
by sensors. A cycle consists in: (i) signaling Budget that a new cycle has started;
(ii) updating the river status; (iii) registering newly deployed sensors; (iv) sig-
naling each SensorEnv connector to deliver a new measure, and (v) waiting for
each SensorEnv connector to confirm that a new measure has been delivered.
The Sensor, SensorEnv, and ZigBee elements can dynamically added and re-
moved during the execution of the system, through reconfigurations triggered by
the gateway component. We have modeled two reconfigurations, namely adding
and removing a sensor, as depicted in Fig. 6.
The gateway component decides to add a sensor if the coverage of the river is
not optimal and the budget is sufficient to deploy a new sensor. This operation
is triggered by sending a message to Reconf via the newS connection, with
the desired location for the new sensor. The new sensor is connected to other
sensors in range via a ZigBee connector, as shown in Fig. 6(a). During this
operation, Reconf decomposes the main architecture to include the new elements
and unifications before recomposing it. The reconfiguration uses the position of
each sensor to determine which links have to be created. After triggering the
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Fig. 6. Reconfigurations in the flood monitoring system: (a) adding sensor s3, which
requires connecting it to existing sensors s1 and s2 through new ZigBee connectors;
(b) removal of sensor s5.
reconfiguration, the gateway indicates to the Budget connector that it spent the
price of a sensor.
The gateway removes a sensor when it receives a message indicating that
it is in failure. This operation is triggered by sending a message to Reconf via
the removeS connection, with the name of the sensor to remove. Removing a
sensor may isolate other sensors that are further away from the gateway as it in
shown in Fig. 6(b). In this case, sensors that were sending their measures via the
removed sensor (such as s4) are instead connected to a sink connector, which
loses all messages. This new connection prevents deadlocks that occur when the
last element of the isolated chain cannot propagate its message.
Finally, when a sensor is removed, the connected ZigBee and SensorEnv
are composed in a separated architecture. This architecture connects the killZb
connection of the sensor to the die connections of the ZigBee connectors, which
allows an other branch of the behavior to properly terminate these components.
6.2 Requirements
As previously mentioned, a DynBLTL formula requires bounds on temporal
operators to ensure that it can be decided in a finite number of steps. We have two
possibilities to express bounds, namely using steps or using time units. Usually,
the number of steps executed during a time unit depends on the number of
components in the system. For instance, the number of steps executed during a
cycle mainly depends on the number of sensors deployed since each sensor reads
one value at each cycle. In our model, a time unit correspond to a cycle, thus
allowing us to specify bounds that are independent of the number of components
in the system.
First, we want to evaluate the correctness of our model with respect to its
main goal, i.e., warning about imminent flooding. In this context, a false negative
occurs when the system fails to predict a flood.
eventually before X time units { // FalseNeg(X,Y)
(gw.alert = "low") and (eventually before Y time units env.flood)
}
This property characterizes a false negative: the gateway predicts a low risk and
a flood occurs in the next Y time units. The parameters of this formula are X,
the time during which the system is monitored, and Y , the time during which
the prediction of the gateway should hold. Similarly, a false positive occurs when
the system predicts a flood that does not actually occur:
eventually before X time units { // FalsePos(X,Y)
gw.alert = "flood detected"
and always during Y time units not env.flood
}
The system is correct if there is no false negatives nor false positives for the
expected prediction anticipation (parameter Y ).
These two formulas are actually BLTL formulas as they involve simple pred-
icate on the state. However, DynBLTL allows expressing properties about the
dynamic architecture of the system. For example, suppose that one wants to
check that if a sensor sends a message indicating that it is failing, then it is
removed from the system in a reasonable amount of time. This disconnection is
needed because the sensor in failure will not pass incoming messages. We char-
acterize the removal of a sensor by a link on the end connection, corresponding
to the initiation of the sensor termination (not detailed here).
In our dynamic system, sensors may appear and disappear during execution.
Therefore, the temporal pattern above needs to be dynamically instantiated at
each step for each existing sensor:
always during X time units { // RemoveSensor(X,Y)
forall s:allOfType(Sensor) {
(isTrue s.measure < 0) implies {
eventually before Y time units {
exists st:allOfType(StartTerminate)
areLinked(st.start,s.end)
}
}
}
}
This property cannot be stated in BLTL since it does not have a construct such
as “forall” for instantiating a variable number of temporal sub-formulas, where
the number depend on the current state.
Another property of interest consists in checking if a sensor is available, i.e.,
at least one sensor is connected to the gateway. More precisely, we require that
there is a ZigBee connected to the gateway and to a sensor. If not, we require
that such a sensor appear in less than Y time units:
always during X time units { // SensorAvailable(X,Y)
(not (exists zb:allOfType(ZigBee) areLinked(zb.output,gw.pass)
and (exists s:allOfType(Sensor) areLinked(s.measure,zb.input))))
implies (eventually before Y time units {
exists zb:allOfType(ZigBee) areLinked(zb.output,gw.pass)
and (exists s:allOfType(Sensor) areLinked(s.measure,zb.input))
}
}
6.3 Experimental Results
In this section, we report some experiments aiming to quantitatively evaluate the
efficiency of our approach to support the architectural analysis activity. Consid-
ering that the literature already reports that PLASMA and its SMC algorithms
outperform other existing approaches (c.f. [4, 11, 14]), we are hereby interested in
assessing how efficient is our approach and toolchain to verify properties in dy-
namic software architectures. In the experiments, we have chosen computational
effort in terms of execution time and RAM consumption as metrics, which were
used to observe the performance of our toolchain when varying the precision of
the verification. As PLASMA is executed upon a Java Virtual Machine, 20 runs
were performed for each precision value in order to ensure a proper statistical
significance for the results. The experiments were conducted under GNU/Linux
on a computer with a quad-core 3 GHz processor and 16 GB of RAM.
We evaluate our toolchain with the properties from Section 6.2. We rely
on the Chernoff algorithm [9] from PLASMA, which requires a precision and
a confidence degree as parameters. The algorithm returns an approximation
of the probability with an error below the precision parameter, with the given
confidence. We choose a confidence of 95% and a precision of either 0.1, 0.05, 0.04,
0.03 or 0.02, requiring respectively 185, 738, 1153, 2050 and 4612 simulations.
Fig. 7(a) shows how the error decreases when the analysis time increases.
The property regarding the sensor availability evaluated over a window of 50
time units requires less time than the other properties evaluated over a window
of 100 time units because the analysis of each trace is faster. In Fig. 7(b), it is
possible to observe that the increase of the amount of RAM required to perform
the analyses is not strongly influenced by the precision. This can be explained
by the fact that SMC only analyzes one trace at a time. Finally, we can conclude
that our SMC approach and toolchain can be regarded as efficient with respect
to both execution time and RAM consumption.
Discussion. We rely here on the Chernov bound to compute the number
of simulations needed, which increases quadratically in the precision. In case of
rare events, i.e., properties that have a very low probability to happen, a better
convergence can be obtained by using dedicated methods [11]. In terms of size,
our current model contains about 30 processes in total.
7 Final Remarks
In this paper, we have presented our approach on the use of statistical model
checking (SMC) to verify properties in dynamic software architectures. Our main
(a) (b)
Fig. 7. Effects of the variation in the precision in the analysis of three properties upon
analysis time (a) and amount of RAM required (b).
contribution is an SMC-based toolchain for specifying and verifying such proper-
ties atop the PLASMA platform. The inputs for this process are a probabilistic
version of an architecture description in the pi-ADL language and a set of proper-
ties expressed in DynBLTL. We have used a real-world flood monitoring system
to show how to specify properties in a dynamic software architectures, as well
as it was used in some computational experiments aimed to demonstrate that
our approach and toolchain are efficient and hence feasible to be applied on the
architectural analysis task. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first work on
the application of SMC to verify properties in dynamic software architectures.
As future work, we need to assess the expressiveness and usability of Dyn-
BLTL for expressing properties in dynamic software architectures. Finally, we
intend to integrate our approach into a framework aimed to support software ar-
chitects in activities such as architectural representation and formal verification
of architectural properties.
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